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  2Introduction 
 
Developing countries in Asia have a large stake in maintaining an open global system 
of trade and investment. The integration of the region into the world economy has been 
driven largely by market forces, particularly by private foreign direct investment and the 
related rise of intra-industry trade. When assessing the growth of Asia's trade and the 
respective roles of policy, technology and markets in influencing patterns of regional 
integration, a key conclusion that emerges is that technological change, markets and the 
private sector, particularly multinational firms and FDI, have been crucial in deepening 
integration. To date, empirical studies suggest that bilateral and regional trade and investment 
agreements have had only a limited impact on Asia’s integration process, the most significant 
liberalization efforts having been unilateral in character.  
Increasing trade integration within East and South- East Asia has been closely 
associated with changes in industrial organization and the spread of international production 
sharing, or the fragmentation of vertically integrated supply chains. The attractiveness of East 
and South- East Asia as production and investment locations has been enhanced by a variety 
of measures that reduce the friction and cost of trade, such as investment in ports and other 
infrastructure, the establishment of special economic zones and bonded industrial warehouses 
and duty drawback schemes. These arrangements have allowed investors to take advantage of 
economies of scale and specialization. 
There are, however, unmistakable signs that the dynamics of Asian integration are 
changing, not least because of the protracted difficulties encountered in multilateral trade 
negotiations and the concomitant shift towards greater reliance on preferential routes to trade 
and investment integration, but also in the light of the emergence of, and competitive threats 
and opportunities from, China and India as regional giants. 
Countries in Asia and in other regions are increasingly experimenting with 
preferential trade and investment agreements, most often on a bilateral basis. Such a trend is 
currently on a strong upswing throughout Asia and increasingly spans several regions. 
Indeed, Asia's "noodle bowl" of overlapping trade agreements is not only expanding, but is 
increasingly involved with complex agreements in other parts of the world (see figure 1 and 
table 1). Such cross-regional agreements are driven by a variety of concerns such as energy 
security, access to minerals and other natural resources. They may also represent efforts by 
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Asian countries to "lock in" reforms by making them part of formal trade and investment 
treaties with a major developed country or region. Many such agreements are also motivated 
by political considerations, as countries seek to cement diplomatic alliances by providing 
economic benefits to partners.  Figure 1.  On the rise: preferential trade agreements in Asia, April 2006 
 
 
Source: Nicolas 2006. 
  5Table 1.  A typology of Asian preferential trade agreements 
Bilateral Regional/Plurilateral 




Japan-Brunei Darussalam (2007) 
Japan-Indonesia 
Japan-Republic of Korea 
Japan-Thailand 
Japan-Viet Nam 
Republic of Korea-Singapore (2006) 
Malaysia-Republic of Korea (2005) 
Thailand-China (2003) 
Thailand-Lao People’s Democratic Republic (2001) 








Republic of Korea-Chile (2004) 
Republic of Korea-United States (2007) 
Japan-Australia 
Japan-India 
Republic of Korea-Mexico 





Singapore-New Zealand (2001) 
Singapore-Australia(2003) 










ASEAN Free Trade Area (1992) 
China-ASEAN [(2004  (goods) and 
2006 (services)] 
Republic of Korea-ASEAN (2006) 
Japan-ASEAN 
Asia-Pacific Economic Relation Cooperation 
(1989) 
Singapore-European Free trade Association 
(2003) 
Republic of Korea- European Freetrade 
Association (2005) 
Thailand- European Free trade Association 
ASEAN-India 
China- Gulf Cooperation Council  
China-Southern Africa Customs Union 
Trans-Pacific (Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, 
New Zealand, Chile) (2005) 
European Union-ASEAN 
European Union-India 
European Union-Republic of Korea 













Source: Nicolas (2006); updated by the author.  
Note: Entries in italics refer to agreements under negotiation. As Asia's preferential trade and investment agreements are still for the most part at an 
early stage, it is difficult to assess their effects empirically and assign structural influences to 
their core provisions. Yet as they are implemented, such agreements will begin to have an 
impact on both regional and global trade and investment flows. Accordingly, it is important 
that preferential trade and investment liberalization be conducted in such a way that it 
supports, rather than contradicts, the openness that has so far been a defining characteristic of 
Asia's trade expansion and its integration into world markets.  
This article takes stock of recent trends in the investment dimensions of deepening 
economic integration in Asia. It first explores the forces underlying the recent trend towards 
regional integration in Asia, in particular the distinction between de facto (driven by markets) 
and de jure (driven by formal institutional arrangements) forms of integration. The article then 
reviews the salient features of attempts to liberalize investment in Asia, focusing on the 
process of investment liberalization conducted among ASEAN countries through the Asian 
Investment Agreement (AIA) and between individual ASEAN countries and a set of key third 
country partners in Asia. Further, it draws on a sample of 19 key preferential trade agreements 
that demonstrate various degrees of comprehensiveness governing the protection and 
liberalization of cross-border investment activity.  
 
The article concludes by assessing the possible effects of the recent shift towards de 
jure or treaty-driven forms of investment liberalization and rule-making, offering insights 
notably on the implications of ongoing trends for third-country investors and service 
providers operating in the region.   
 
A. Understanding the rise of Asian regionalism 
 
A major transformation in the global governance of cross-border trade and investment 
activity has occurred since 1995. The first major development was the creation of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the global institution governing the conduct of international 
trade, in 1995. Rules contained in the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO
1 feature  
                                                 
1 See large instruments embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, done at 





  8the most ambitious and comprehensive multilateral provisions ever ratified. Somewhat 
paradoxically, the second major development in international trade relationships during the 
same period has been the proliferation of bilateral, regional and other preferential trade 
agreements among nations. As the Doha Development Agenda (DDA)
2  of WTO continues to 
sputter, it is likely that recourse to preferential trade and investment liberalization will 
proliferate further in coming years. Such developments are forcing many WTO member states 
to review and reassess their trade policy strategies and priorities.  
 
The creation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) is by no means new. However, 
as figure 2 below shows vividly, the sheer number and the speed with which such agreements 
have been negotiated since 1995 are simply astonishing. All but one WTO member – 
Mongolia – today conduct some measure of their trade relations on a preferential basis under 
one or more PTAs, and it is estimated that more than half of world trade activity today is 
governed by preferential rules. This section analyzes the recent history, characteristics and 
political economy of regional and bilateral trade integration from the viewpoint of two core 
concepts: integration of markets vs. integration by agreements, with a particular focus on 
Asia. 
 
As its name suggests, the concept of integration of markets focuses on the idea that 
economies can integrate among themselves by relying primarily on the forces of the 
marketplace, i.e. by allowing the private sector to be the vanguard of trade and investment 
integration. This has at times been dubbed de facto integration. The second core concept is 
integration by agreements, which focuses on trade integration centered on recourse to de jure 
trade and investment treaties. This channel of integration emphasizes the primacy of legal 
instruments to further economic integration among countries. 
 
There is little doubt that the two channels of integration are closely related and 
ultimately complementary in nature. The integration of markets without formal trade and 
investment agreements can create uncertainty for businesses inasmuch as the institutional 
foundations of an integrating area may not be sufficiently clear, transparent or predictable. At 
the same time, de jure integration can be meaningless if the underlying economic forces are 
not favourable towards integration, as the early experiences at trade integration in Africa and 
Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s have so clearly revealed. 
                                                 
2 See A/C.2/59/3, annex. 
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Source: World Trade Organization, (2007). 
 
In today’s globalizing environment characterized by deeper forms of integration 
among nations and the operation of regional and global innovation and production networks, 
the question arises as to the better means of integration in driving trade integration. Is there a 
logical sequence for policymakers to consider when examining these two channels of 
integration? Given that East and South-East Asia and Latin America are fertile regions in 
which various types of PTAs have proliferated in recent years, it is useful to review the 
experiences of these two regions in addressing these questions.  
 
Asia has lagged behind Latin America in concluding formal trade agreements because 
key trading powers in the region, such as Japan, the Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Hong 
Kong, China, had traditionally been more supportive of an open multilateral system, while 
China and Taiwan Province of China only recently joined the WTO.  
 
  10The process of regional integration in Asia can be regarded as de facto in character 
even though by the end of 1990s most countries in the region had shown considerably greater 
interest in de jure forms of regionalism. The recent momentum towards formal (de jure) 
regional integration has been accompanied by a proliferation of bilateral PTAs not only 
within Asia but also with extra-regional countries, in particular with Latin America.  
 
After a first wave of largely failed attempts to promote treaty-based forms of regional 
integration in the 1960s and 1970s, Latin American countries renewed de jure integration 
efforts in the early 1990s, with two agreements – namely the 1994 North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA, linking Canada, Mexico and the United States, itself an extension 
of the 1988 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement) and the 1995 Common Market of 
the South (MERCOSUR),
3 linking Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, setting a 
process in motion that would witness the emergence of a large and growing number of 
bilateral and regional PTAs among Latin American countries and with extra-regional 
countries by the end of the 1990s.  
 
It is noteworthy that, given the different models of regional integration that have   
predominated in the two regions, intraregional trade in Latin America remains considerably 
lower, at around 25 per cent, of that observed in East Asia, despite Latin America’s putative 
first mover advantage in de jure integration (see table 2). 
 
Table 2. East Asian and Latin American intraregional trade, various years 
 
Year 
Share of intraregional East 
Asian exports in total East 
Asian exports 
 
Share of intraregional 
Latin American exports in 
total Latin American 
exports 
1985  34.1 10.0 
1990  39.7 10.9 
1995  48.1 17.2 
2000  46.4 13.1 
2006  51.7 13.1 
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, various years. 
                                                 
3 MERCOSUR was created by the signing of the Treat of Asuncion in 1991, and the transition phase to 
implement the common market was to begin in 1995. 
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The (timid) starting point of Asian de jure integration came with the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) initiated by the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) in 1992. This process had been preceded by the launch in 1989 of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) (Petri, 2006). Although APEC is not a formal 
regional trade agreement, it provides a rather unique institutional setting – a best practice club 
of sorts – aimed at promoting trade and investment liberalization, economic and technical 
cooperation and regulatory convergence on a voluntary basis among its 21 member 
economies. While APEC is not a PTA in legal terms, it features a roadmap, known as the 
Bogor Goals, to achieve free trade and investment in the region by 2010 for its developed 
country members and by 2020 for its developing country members.
4  
 
The recent surge in Asian PTA negotiations can be seen as the region’s response to a 
number of important factors. First, the halting pace of multilateral negotiations at WTO, 
combined with the success of deeper integration initiatives within the European Union and 
NAFTA, have raised interest in the efforts at closer economic integration with “like-minded” 
countries, including in the neighborhood (Bergsten, 1997). The most recent generation of 
PTAs typically covers a number of policy areas that go well beyond existing multilateral 
disciplines and offer deeper market access commitments (OECD, 2007). This includes 
“behind the border” subjects such as services, investment and competition policy that can 
lower service link costs between production networks, thereby enhancing export 
competitiveness in countries reliant on export-led growth models of development (Kimura 
and Ando, 2005; Thorbecke and Yoshitomi, 2006).  
 
A second main reason behind the rising interest in institutionalized integration in 
related to the much keener sense of Asian interdependence that took root in the aftermath of 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 which, combined with the “benign neglect” of 
                                                 
4 At Osaka in November 1995, an agreement was reached on a set of fundamental principles to bring about the 
liberalization of trade and investment among APEC member economies. If the Bogor Goals are realized and the 
commitments of the 21 member economies are fully implemented, APEC countries could enjoy a substantial 
improvement in aggregate welfare through free trade and investment opportunities in the region, without 
however having entered into formal treaty arrangements. APEC adopted “open regionalism” as its underlying 
paradigm with the intention of sharing the benefits of free trade with non-members and thus trying to comply 
with the most favoured nation (MFN) principle of the WTO. The work of APEC in trade and investment 
liberalization has not however achieved the hoped-for success so far. However, this need not necessarily be 
viewed as a failure of “open regionalism”, but rather the result of the broadening of APEC’s agenda, which now 
includes such topics as security, trade facilitation and best practices in regulatory reform. 
  12multilateral financial institutions such as IMF, resulted in increased support for heightened 
regional coordination and integration (Van Hoa, 2002; Nicolas, 2007).  
 
Before 1997 most economists considered economic cooperation in Asia (through trade 
and investment) as an example of a successful de facto regionalism, i.e., explained by the 
predominant interplay of market forces. However, the financial crisis of 1997-1998 revealed 
the weaknesses of informal regional cooperation arrangements. The financial crisis and its 
subsequent contagion to a number of economies in East and South-east Asia painfully 
demonstrated that the East Asian economies were closely intertwined and that a resolution of 
the crisis called for heightened regional cooperation in the trade and financial fields.  
 
A rising sense of Asian identity emerged in the aftermath of the crisis. After the 
proposal to create an Asian monetary fund failed to materialize because of objections from the 
United States, ASEAN leaders responded by inviting China, Japan and the Republic of Korea 
to join a cooperative framework known as “ASEAN+3”, in an effort to achieve greater 
economic cooperation in the region. The ASEAN+3 summit in November 1999 produced the 
“Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation” which covered a wide range of areas for 
regional cooperation. In the early 2000s, other new economic situations-such as the quick 
recovery and recurring growth in Republic of Korea, the emergence of China as an economic 
superpower and the continued stagnant state of the Japanese economy – provided fresh 
impetus to new forms of Asian economic regionalism, including PTAs.  
 
Although the financial crisis might have been the direct cause, a number of additional 
factors have contributed to the breakthrough and proliferation of the policy-led regionalism in 
Asia. First, regionalism was the natural result of decades of fast growth and the industrial 
transformations and economic restructuring that came in its wake. In a very tangible manner, 
de facto regionalism has paved the way and greatly facilitated the region’s subsequent quest 
for de jure integration. The developments depicted above have created a new centre of East 
Asian economic activity that has begun to pose a genuine competitive challenge to North 
America and Europe in terms of its contribution to world output, trade and FDI. This is so 
even as two-way trade and FDI linkages between Asia and both regions have deepened.  
 
A third factor encouraging the trend towards de jure integration in Asia is also closely 
connected to the fallout from the financial crisis, and is linked  to region-wide perceptions of 
  13“benign neglect” on the part of international financial institutions, particularly IMF, in the 
aftermath of the Asian crisis. Asian policymakers perceived that major international 
institutions and the main global trading powers, particularly the United States, fell short in 
their support for the region on the path to deepened cooperation, particularly in the monetary 
and financial fields. 
 
A final impulse is more inherently defensive in nature, owing to rising concerns 
throughout Asia over the competitive threats, including in terms of FDI attractiveness, of 
China’s rise as the manufacturing hub of the world and of India’s growing assertiveness in 
services innovation and trade. There can indeed be little doubt that the rise of China and its 
growing economic and political influence and assertiveness in the region and beyond, appear 
to have elicited a more favourable view of regional and bilateral cooperation and agreements. 
This is particularly true in Japan where the private sector began to express fears over the loss 
of market share, wild swings in currency values and declining FDI attractiveness (Pangestu 
and Gooptu, 2004; Masuyama, 2004; Gaulier and others, 2005; Damuri and others, 2006).  
 
For countries such as India, Malaysia and Thailand, which compete with China for 
horizontal FDI, Eichengreen and Tong (2006) note that those countries have experienced 
greater difficulties in attracting foreign investment in manufacturing as a result of China’s 
emergence. Their version of the China threat – that of an “FDI sucking sound”, has arguably 
provided them with a strong incentive to pursue unilateral reforms at the domestic level and 
enter into PTAs to cement such reforms. 
 
Using the Asian Development Bank’s Asian Regional Integration Centre Free Trade 
Agreement database, Kawai (2007) recently identified several key features of East Asian 
PTAs, focusing on their configuration, outward-orientation, scope (or “WTO+” 
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East Asian preferential trade agreements can be divided into bilateral and plurilateral 
(regional) agreements. Bilateral refers to agreements between two countries, whereas the 
term “plurilateral” covers agreements involving more than two customs territories (e.g. 
Australia-New Zealand-Chile-Singapore-Brunei Darussalam FTA), one territory (or 
territories) and a trading bloc (e.g. European Free Trade Association-Republic of Korea) 
or two trading blocs (e.g. European Union-Association of Southeast Asian Nations). On 
the whole, Asian countries are primarily opting for simple bilateral PTA configurations 
rather than the more complex plurilateral ones, as the former may be easier and speedier 
to negotiate and may be preferred by leading trading partners. There were 25 bilateral 
PTAs concluded by East Asian countries as of mid-2007, representing 76 per cent of all 
concluded PTAs). Among those currently under negotiation, bilateral PTAs also 
predominate, making up 80 per cent of the total. There are eight plurilateral agreements 
among concluded PTAs in East Asia, and an additional eight other agreements under 
negotiation.   
 
Orientation 
Looking at East Asian PTAs, the high degree of outward orientation is striking. Of all 
concluded PTAs, 22 were with countries or groups of countries outside East Asia in mid-
2007. The outward orientation of East Asian PTAs under negotiation is even higher at 85 
per cent. Having launched PTA negotiations with India, Australia and New Zealand, 
ASEAN as a group has most recently commenced PTA negotiations with the European 
Union. Singapore has concluded eight cross-regional PTAs with a wide geographical 
spread from North America and Latin America to the China, Japan, Middle East. 
Republic of Korea and Thailand, have also all concluded PTAs with trading partners in 
Latin America. China has concluded a PTA (goods only) with Pakistan and is negotiating 
PTAs with the member countries of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the 
Gulf as well as Iceland. The above trends lend support to East Asia’s purported aim of 




The 33 PTAs (covering goods and/or services) concluded in East Asia may be broken 
down into four subcategories based on their scope of coverage: (a) goods-only; (b) goods 
and services; (c) goods, services and the so-called “Singapore Issues” (e.g. trade 
facilitation, trade and investment, trade and competition, transparency in government 
procurement); and (d) goods, services, Singapore Issues and deepened regulatory 
cooperation in areas such as labour standards, trade and environment, small and medium-
sized enterprises, regulatory harmonization or convergence. Two-thirds of the PTAs 
agreed by East Asian countries as of mid-2007, a total of 21 agreements, featured WTO-
plus provisions beyond trade in goods and services (the treatment of trade-related 
intellectual property-related matters being subsumed under the goods trade). Of the total, 
nine feature disciplines on the Singapore Issues only, while 12 are yet more 
comprehensive in scope, featuring disciplines on both the Singapore Issues and regulatory 
cooperation matters.     
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Rule of origin regimes 
 
Rules of origin exist to determine which goods will enjoy preferential tariff treatment and 
thus prevent trade deflection among PTA members. Three such regimes can be found in 
PTAs: (a) a change in tariff classification (CTC) rule defined at a detailed level in the 
Harmonized System level; (b) a regional (or local) content or value-added rule requiring a 
product to satisfy a minimum regional (or local) value added (VA) in the exporting 
country or region of a PTA; and (c) a specific process (SP) rule mandating a particular 
production process for individual goods or product categories. Of the 28 free trade 
agreements concluded in East Asia, the majority (18) have adopted a combination of the 
three rules of origin regimes depicted above rather than applying one specific regime. Of 
the remaining, three have adopted the value added rule, another three use a combination 
of value added and CTC rules, while another four combine value added and specific 
process rules. The simplest rule of origin can be found under AFTA and the ASEAN-
China FTA, which specifies a 40 per cent regional value content across all tariffs. Many 
agreements involving Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore tend to use a 
combination of rules of origin. 
 
Source: Kawai, 2007. 
Note: The ADB defines “East Asia” as comprising the following group of countries: China including the 
Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong, China and Macau, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia 
and Taiwan, Province of China. 
 
 
B. Recent trends in FDI flows to Asia 
 
FDI flows to Asia and Oceania reached a new high in 2006 of US$230 billion up 15 per cent 
from 2005. The share of the region in total FDI in developing countries thus rose from 59 per 
cent to 63 per cent. Most FDI in and from the Asian region continues to come from and be 
directed towards Japan, the European Union and the United States. However, apart from 
Japan, other Asian countries are increasingly investing within the region (see figure 3). 
Taiwan Province of China thus invested more than US$4 billion in ASEAN countries during 
the period 2001-2005, making the island economy the sixth largest investor in the ASEAN 
block. Republic of Korea and China are also investing heavily in the region, having become 
the ninth and tenth most important investors, respectively, in ASEAN between 2001 and 
2005. During the same period, intra-ASEAN FDI was more than $13 billion, constituting 11 
per cent of the total FDI to the region. 
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Figure 2.  ASEAN FDI net inflow from 
selected countries/regions, 2001-2005











Share to total net inflow (%)
Source: ASEAN 2006, tables 26 & 27  
FDI has provided a major boost to Asian trade in recent decades (ADB, 2006). As 
noted previously, production networks within the region have spurred trade in parts and 
components to other Asian countries, whereas vertical supply chains with countries outside 
the region have increased trade in capital goods, intermediate goods and final products. 
Through their global distribution and marketing chains, multinationals investing in Asia have 
played an important part in this process. This is reflected in the growing role of foreign-
owned firms in exports from developing Asian countries (see figure 4 and ADB, 2006).  



















  17C. Preferential investment liberalization in Asia: salient features 
 
This section focuses attention on the key investment provisions found in a sample of 
19 preferential trade and investment agreements (PTAs) in Asia and assesses their 
implications for third-country investors. As investors in services are often treated separately, 
interactions between the investment and service chapters of the agreements reviewed are also 
discussed. Box 2 below lists the sample of Asian agreements featuring the investment 
provisions under review. This section draws on ongoing work by the author for which the 
core findings are summarized in tables 3 to 8 below (Sauve and others). 
 
By and large, the incipient research findings support the main insights found in Kumar 
(2007) which drew attention to an investment rule-making landscape in Asia characterized by 
increasing complexity and diversity but with a continued bias towards investment 
liberalization and the ability of third-country investors to broadly share in the benefits of 
ongoing trends in regional integration. 
  18 
Box 2.   Investment in Asian preferential trade agreements: agreements under review 
 
Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership (2006)  
Japan-Mexico Economic Partnership (2005) 
Japan-Singapore New-Age Economic Partnership Agreement (2002)  
Thailand-Australia Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) (2005)  
European Community-Chile Association Agreement (2003-2005)  
Commission mandate to negotiate an European Community preferential trade agreement with 
ASEAN (excluding. Myanmar, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Cambodia) (2007) 
Free Trade Agreement between European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and Singapore 
(2003)  
Free Trade Agreement between EFTA and the Republic of Korea (2006) (Norway is not a 
party to the investment chapter) 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership among Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand 
and Singapore (May 2006) (not notified to the WTO) 
The New Zealand-Singapore Closer Economic Partnership (2001)  
Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Chile (2004)  
Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Singapore (2006)  
India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Co-operation Agreement (2005) 
Framework Agreement on ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) (1998) and the ASEAN 
Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) (1995) as amended by the 2003 Protocol  
Draft for Free Trade Agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea (2007) 
Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Singapore (2004) 
Proposal by the United States for an investment chapter in a PTA with Thailand (2006) 
Services chapter of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (ACCEC; 2007) 
 
  191. Definition and rules of origin for investment 
 
Most PTAs in the region use a broad and “asset-based” definition of investments in the 
investment chapter, whereas a narrower “enterprise-based” definition of service investments 
is used in the services chapters (see table 3). Most definitions of commercial presence require 
ownership or control by natural or legal persons covered under the agreement as defined 
under its rules of origin/denial of benefits clauses (see below). The European Commission’s 
recent mandate to negotiate an European Union-ASEAN agreement applies an enterprise-
based definition of investors, but is highly transparent as one single chapter governs all 
investors.  
 
In general, rules of origin (denial of benefits clauses) applied to investors and their 
investments (including Mode 3 commercial presence for FDI in service industries) under 
Asian PTAs are fairly liberal (see table 4). The most restrictive origin criterion for juridical 
persons – ownership and control – is applied in only two of the PTAs reviewed. Third-country 
juridical persons constituted or otherwise organized under the laws of a party with substantial 
business operations there – or in some cases those of any party – therefore enjoy preferential 
treatment under most agreements, conferring de facto MFN treatment to third country 
investors and contributing to minimizing the investment-distorting effects of PTAs. Rules of 
origin for natural persons extend benefits to permanent residents in some agreements, 
including those of EFTA (with the possibility of reservations for particular types of service 
suppliers). This is not the case for past or currently negotiated agreements of the United States 
or European Union, however.  
 
It is important to contrast the “benign” rule of origin provisions found in the services 
and investment chapters of Asian PTAs (which are similar to those of most PTAs in general 
with the exception of a few South-South PTAs such as Mercosur, the Andean Pact or the 
China-Hong Kong CEPA, which have tended to adopt slightly more restrictive denial of 
benefits clauses designed to confer first mover advantages to investments that are owned and 
controlled by juridical persons that are nationals of the integrating area) to those governing 
rules of origin in goods trade, whose restrictive nature in selected sectors have been shown to 
carry considerably greater risks for trade- and investment-distortive conduct (the paper reverts 
to the issue of rules of origin for goods trade in section D below).  
 
  20Moreover, even if rules of origin (denial of benefits) for investment are liberal overall, market 
access restrictions – such as maximum levels for foreign equity participation - still restrict 
coverage substantially in some service industries (though considerably less frequently in 
manufacturing). In contrast, some Asian countries such as Singapore have made significant 
market access commitments in the services sector.   
 
2. Key treatment provisions 
 
Third-country service providers (modes 1, 2 and 4) covered under Asian PTAs can 
expect to be granted national treatment less often than investors (mode 3). Many agreements 
in the region list national treatment for services on a positive list basis and for investment on a 
negative list basis, whereas some agreements typically include national treatment on a 
negative list basis for both services and investments. Whereas an in-depth analysis of each 
country’s sector and sub-sector schedules is necessary to establish whether obligations are 
more far-reaching in one agreement than another, agreements predicated on negative listing 
suggest wider coverage (Fink and Molinuevo, 2007; Roy, Marchetti and Lim, 2006).  
 
Tables 5 to 7 below summarize the key treatment provisions found in Asian PTAs. 
Most PTAs include most-favoured-nation (MFN) clauses. There is no apparent pattern, 
however, as to which types of agreements exclude MFN provisions and whether agreements 
are based on negative or positive-list approaches. Several agreements, notably those entered 
into by EFTA countries with partners in the region (Republic of Korea and Singapore), 
include a wide exception to MFN treatment for all other PTAs in clauses related to regional 
economic integration organization exceptions. NAFTA-inspired agreements, such as the 
United States agreements with the Republic of Korea and Singapore, allow the parties to 
benefit from better treatment granted to third parties in another PTA signed after-but not 
before-the entry into force of the PTA. As more recent agreements tend to include wider 
commitments, the NAFTA-type approach to MFN treatment, if still imperfect, is better able to 
multilateralize preferential commitments. That said, the tendency towards permitting broad 
exemptions to MFN treatment reduces its practical relevance in the context of Asian PTAs. 
 
For both national treatment and MFN clauses, semantic differences across 
agreements may have important implications. Negative list service chapters typically use the 
term “in like circumstances” instead of the GATS language, “like service suppliers and 
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and AIA. If future jurisprudence establishes that the first term is broader in scope, then third-
country service suppliers may have obtained lower coverage. On the other hand, future 
jurisprudence might also clarify whether, mentioning both “services” and “service 
providers” entails wider coverage than referring only to the latter as is the case in United 
States agreements with Singapore and the Republic of Korea.  
 
3. Provisions on investment protection 
 
In contrast to treatment standards, provisions on investment protection typically do not 
vary depending on whether the investment is in services or in other sectors (see table 8). Most 
of the sample PTAs reviewed feature key investment protection provisions, including 
umbrella clauses
5, transfer provisions, overall treatment standards, expropriation clauses and 
compensation requirements. Apart from certain exceptions, protection provisions are largely 
comparable to those found in bilateral investment treaties. 
 
Transfers of capital in connection with foreign investments are also protected in a 
relatively consistent and robust manner across Asian PTAs. Agreements guarantee investors 
the right to transfer current and capital transactions without delay, and to use particular 
currencies at specified exchange rates, subject to common exceptions in the case of serious 
balance-of-payments, exchange rate or monetary policy difficulties. 
 
It is not clear from available case law whether “fair and equitable treatment” is an 
independent treatment standard. If it is, then third-country investors might have obtained 
stronger protection rights under some PTAs than investors covered under agreements that: 
don’t include this standard; or  include it but mention that it is similar to established 
customary international law, as is the case in United States agreements.   
 
Apart from the European Union agreements, all reviewed PTAs with investment 
coverage broadly mimic standard bilateral investment treaty provisions on direct and indirect 
expropriation and compensation requirements. However, the EFTA-Singapore agreement 
refers to ‘de facto’ rather than ‘indirect’ expropriation and does not specify compensation 
                                                 
5 An umbrella clause stipulates that the host country assumes the responsibility to respect other obligations it has 
with regard to investments of investors of the other contracting party and thus not only in connection with an 
investment agreement. 
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jurisprudence, but it is doubtful in this case, given Singapore’s overall investor-friendly 
environment and the fact that the two terms are often used interchangeably.  
 
4. Provisions on dispute settlement 
 
Except for European Union agreements, all PTAs with investment coverage reviewed 
in this paper offer investors the choice of investor-to-state dispute settlement under the World 
Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or ad hoc 
procedures using UNCITRAL rules in most instances (see table 8). Service investors will not 
be able to bring a dispute to investor-State arbitration if it relates to matters not covered by the 
investment chapter, as is sometimes the case in agreements with separate, self-contained, 
chapters covering all aspects relating to trade and investment in financial services (following 
the NAFTA precedent). The latter thus have to rely on ad hoc Sate-to-State arbitration. 
Service companies tend to enjoy access to investor-to-State arbitration for all aspects covering 
investment in services (with the exception of financial services),, whereas national treatment 
and MFN provision for commercial presence are not covered by the investor-to-State 
mechanism in other agreements. 
 
In contrast to United States agreements, some PTAs require consent by the disputing 
parties – though only in the case of pre-establishment disputes for some agreements – and do 
not always include explicit transparency provisions. Many agreements moreover do not allow 
for consolidation of two or more separately-submitted claims with a question of law or fact in 
common and arising out of the same events or circumstances. 
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Table 3.  Investment and commercial presence: definitions and relationships 
Agreement  Definition of investment 
Definition of commercial 
presence in services 
chapter 
Relationship between investment in services 
and horizontal investment disciplines 
Japan-
Malaysia 
Asset based– open list: includes FDI, portfolio 
investment and various forms of tangible and 
intangible property. 
GATS definition of 
commercial presence. 
Service chapter prevails in case of inconsistencies 
with the investment chapter’s obligations on 
national treatment, most favoured nation, and 
performance requirements. 
Japan-Mexico  Asset based– closed list: includes FDI, portfolio 
investment and various forms of tangible and 
intangible property. 
  Investment disciplines apply. 
Japan-
Singapore 
Asset based– open list: includes FDI, portfolio 
investment and various forms of tangible and 
intangible property. 
GATS definition of 
commercial presence. 
Relationship not expressly defined. Singapore has 
scheduled a reservation giving precedence to the 
services disciplines in case of inconsistencies with 
investment chapter’s obligation on national 





FDI as defined by IMF.  GATS definition of 
commercial presence. 





Direct investment include branches  GATS definition of 
commercial presence. 
Ownership or control not 
necessary. 










Builds on GATS provisions of commercial presence and extends them to investors 
in non-services sectors. Ownership or control not necessary. 





Asset based-open list: includes FDI, portfolio 
investment and various forms of tangible and 
intangible property. 
GATS definition of 
commercial presence. 
The investment chapter’s national treatment and 
most favoured nation obligations do not apply to 





Asset based-open list: includes FDI, portfolio 
investment and various forms of tangible and 
intangible property. 
GATS definition of 
commercial presence. 
The investment chapter’s national treatment and 
most favoured nation obligations do not apply to 







Investment chapter still under negotiation.  GATS definition of 
commercial presence. 
Ownership or control not 
necessary. 
No investment disciplines yet, only services 
disciplines apply 
New Zealand – 
Singapore 
Asset based–open list: includes FDI, portfolio 
investment and various forms of tangible and 
intangible property. 
GATS definition of 
commercial presence. 
Ownership or control not 
necessary. 
The investment chapter’s national treatment and 
most favoured nation obligations do not apply to 
commercial presence as governed by services 
chapter. 
Chile – 
Republic of  
Asset based-open list: includes FDI, portfolio 
investment and various forms of tangible and 
  Investment disciplines apply. 






Asset based-open list: includes FDI, portfolio 
investment and various forms of tangible and 
intangible property. 
  Investment disciplines apply. 
India – 
Singapore 
Asset based-open list:  Includes FDI, portfolio 
investment and various forms of tangible and 
intangible property. 
GATS definition of 
commercial presence. 
Service chapter prevails in case of inconsistencies. 
AIA/AFAS 
 
Asset based- open list. Excludes portfolio 
investment. 
Not explicitly defined, but 
implicitly follows GATS. 




Asset based-open list: includes FDI, portfolio 
investment and various forms of tangible and 
intangible property. 
GATS definition of 
commercial presence for 
financial services. 
Investment disciplines apply. 
United States-
Singapore 
Asset based-open list: includes FDI, portfolio 
investment and various forms of tangible and 
intangible property. 




Asset based-open list: includes FDI, portfolio 
investment and various forms of tangible and 
intangible property. 
No draft available.  National treatment provision in investment chapter 
does not apply to services. Service chapter prevails 
in case of inconsistencies. 
Services 




Investment chapter still under negotiation.  GATS definition of 
commercial presence. 




a)  Excluding Myanmar, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Cambodia. 
b)  United States proposal 
 
 
  25 
Table 4. Rules of origin/denial of benefits1 













or controlled service 
suppliers/investors 
Extended to judicial 
persons constituted 
under domestic laws 
and having 
substantial business 
operations in the 
domestic territory 
Other provisions 
Japan-Malaysia  Yes No  (Japan) 
Yes (Malaysia) 
No  Yes  Parties can deny FTA benefits to service providers and 
investors from non-parties with which a party does not 
maintain diplomatic relations or where certain trade 
sanctions apply.  
Investment chapter does not extend benefits to 
branches of enterprises of third States. 
Japan-Mexico  Yes  No  No  Yes  Parties can deny FTA benefits to investors from non-
parties with which a party does not maintain 
diplomatic relations or where certain trade sanctions 
apply. 
Japan-Singapore  Yes No  (Japan) 
Yes (Singapore) 
No  Yes  Benefits also extended to juridical persons with 
substantial business operations in the territory of any 




Yes No  Yes   














Yes  No  No  Yes  Benefits also extended to juridical persons with 
substantial business operations (“possesses a real and 










No  Yes  Benefits also extended to juridical persons with 
substantial business operations in the territory of any 
party (services chapter only) 
European Free 
Trade Association -
Republic of Korea 
 





No  Yes  Benefits also extended to juridical persons with 
substantial business operations in the territory of any 
WTO member, if service supplier is owned or 
controlled by person of a party (services chapter only). 
Trans-Pacific SEP3    Yes  No  Yes  Benefits also extended to juridical persons with 
substantial business operations in the territory of any 
party (services chapter only). 




No  Yes  Benefits also extended to juridical persons with 
substantial business operations in the territory of any 
party (services chapter only). 
 
No substantial business operations test in investment 
chapter. 
Chile – Republic of 
Korea 
 
Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Parties can deny FTA benefits to investors from non-
parties with which a party does not maintain 
diplomatic relations or where certain trade sanctions 
apply (investment chapter only). 
Republic of Korea – 
Singapore 
Yes Yes  No  Yes   
India – Singapore  Yes Yes  Yes   





(for services supplied 
cross border and 
through consumption 
abroad) 
Benefits can be denied if the juridical person is owned 
or controlled by persons of the denying party (only for 
modes 1 and 2 in services).  
AFAS/AIA 
 





No  Yes  Benefits also extended to juridical persons with 
substantial business operations in the territory of any 
party (services chapter only). 
Investment chapter allows for cumulated equity 
calculations.  
Unite States-
Republic of Korea 
draft 
Yes  No  No  Yes  Parties can deny FTA benefits to service providers and 
investors from non-parties with which a party does not 
maintain normal economic relations or where certain 
trade sanctions apply. 
United States-
Singapore 
Yes  No  No  Yes  Parties can deny FTA benefits to service providers and 
investors from non-parties with which a party does not 
maintain diplomatic relations or where certain trade 
sanctions apply. 
Services chapter of 
the China-ASEAN 
Free Trade Area 
draft3 




a)  Excludes Myanmar, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Cambodia 















  27Table 5. Treatment of investment 
  Establishment  Post-establishment 
National treatment  Most favoured Nation  National treatment  Most favoured Nation 









Negative list  Positive list  Negative list 
Japan-Malaysia    +     + (Not vis-à-vis ASEAN 
members for Malaysia) 
  +     +(not vis-à-vis 
ASEAN members for 
Malaysia) 
Japan-Mexico    +    + (Not past agreements, and 
three sectors in future 
agreements) 
  +    +(not past agreements, 
and three sectors in 
future agreements) 




+       +      +    +  
European 
Community-Chile 
(does not replace 
BITs) 








(does not replace 
Bilateral investment 
treaties) 




































Trans-Pacific SEP  No investment disciplines yet. 
New Zealand – 
Singapore 
 +    +    +    + 













Republic of Korea – 
Singapore 
 +    Request    +    Request 
India – Singapore  + 
India 
+ Singapore    Request  +      Request 
ASEAN Investment   +    +    +    + 
  28Area 






Republic of Korea 
Draft 
 +    + 
(not past agreements, and 
three sectors in future 
agreements) 
 +    + 
(not past agreements, 




 +    + 
(not past agreements, and 
three sectors in future 
agreements) 
 +    + 
(not past agreements, 





 +    + 
(not past agreements, and 
three sectors in future 
agreements) 
 +    + 
(not past agreements, 
and three sectors in 
future agreements) 
Services chapter of 
the China-ASEAN 
Free Trade Area 
draft 
Investment chapter under negotiation. No draft available.  
 
Notes: 
a)  Excludes Myanmar, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Cambodia 
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Table 6.  Treatment of services
1




Most favoured nation  Market Access 
National 
treatment 
































(not binding for 
preferences under 
other PTIA) 
+  +     
+ 





     +   
+ (not past 
agreements, and 3 
sectors in future 
agreements) 
    +   
+ (not past 
agreements, and 3 













+   +   
No most favoured nation 
clause or request 
+  +   
No most favoured nation 
























































 +    +   
+ 
(not past 
agreements, and 3 
sectors in future 
agreements for 
Chile, New Zealand 
and Singapore) 
 +   +   
+ 
(not past 
agreements, and 3 
sectors in future 
agreements for 





+  ++   
No most favoured nation 
clause or request 
  +   
No most favoured nation 
clause or request 
  30Chile – 
Republic of 
Korea 


















































agreements, and 3 
sectors in future 
agreements) 
 +   
+ (not 





agreements, and 3 













agreements, and 3 










agreements, and 3 


















a) Excludes Myanmar, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Cambodia 
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Table 7.  Specifications in treatment standards 















to other party 
National Treatment/ most 




























































































































































































































































  +  +     +  +     +   + 
Japan-
Mexico 
+   +    +        +    + 
Japan-
Singapore 










 +  +     
+ 
(Request) 
























Like investors (incl. service suppliers) 
and “all measures affecting 
establishment”
2
Like investors (incl. service suppliers) 















   + 
+ (“Situa-
tion”) 







No reference to 
factual comparisons 
 + 
No reference to 
factual comparisons



















No most favoured 








+   +   




+     +   + 
  32Republic of 
Korea – 
Singapore 
+   +   
Does not mention factual  
comparison in requests 
 +    + 
India – 
Singapore 
 +  +   
Does not mention factual  
comparison in requests 




























+    No draft available +   




















a) Excludes Myanmar, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Cambodia 
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Table 8.   Investment protection and dispute settlement 
Expropriation  Dispute settlement 
Agreement 
Umbrella 











Scope of application of 
investment protection 
disciplines to goods and 
services 
Japan-Malaysia 
  +  +  + + + +  +  All protections apply. 
Japan-Mexico   + 
+  + + + +  +  All protections apply. 
Japan-Singapore   + 














References to BITs  +   










References to BITs  +   






















+  + + + +  + 




No investment disciplines yet. 







  NT and most favoured nation  +  + 
Protection applies to commercial 
presence. 










+  + + + +  +  All  protections  apply. 
  34India – Singapore 
 + 
  + + + + 
+ (Not for NT 
or post-
establishment) 
The services chapter incorporates 
selected protections of the 
investment chapter to be applied 
to commercial presence.  
The protection of the investment 
chapter applies to other 
investments. 
AIA 














  +  +  + + + +  + 




  +  +  + + + +  + 






+  + + + +  + 





Trade Area  
No investment disciplines yet. 
 
Note: 
a)  Excludes Myanmar, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Cambodia 




D. The rise of preferential trade and investment agreements and their likely 
impacts 
  
The general consensus in policy research circles is that the process of economic 
integration in Asia has so far been driven primarily by economic forces due to the FDI-
induced integration of production networks, as well as by the impetus flowing endogenously 
from continued region-wide growth which, ceteris paribus,  naturally increases trade and 
investment activity at the regional level (Dobson and Yue, 1997; Kimura and Ando, 2003; 
Damuri and others, 2006). A report by the Asian Development Bank (2002) finds that, while 
PTAs have the potential to increase intraregional trade and investment flows, as observed 
most markedly in the case of the European Union and NAFTA, their impact on the Asia-
Pacific region to date has been small.  
 
  35However, this dynamic is undergoing significant change as Asian countries 
increasingly turn towards bilateral PTAs rather than the “open regionalism” more 
systematically pursued by ASEAN and APEC (Scollay, 2004; ADB, 2006)
6. In particular, 
Japan, India, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand have all been active in trying to 
facilitate economic integration – and to some extent counterbalance the rise of China, through 
negotiations of formal trade agreements featuring comprehensive disciplines on a bilateral or 
regional investment. The same countries have also been active signatories of bilateral 
investment treaties, both within and outside the region, as the scale of their own FDI outflows 
has grown. 
 
Based on what we know about PTAs in general, the rush towards regional and 
bilateral integration could have important implications for the future of trade and investment 
flows in Asia. In a recent “meta-analysis” of all relevant econometric studies of preferential 
trade agreements, the World Bank (2004) found that regional/bilateral trade increases as a 
result. Such an outcome is confirmed by general equilibrium simulations and there is strong 
evidence that PTAs contribute to the increased regionalization of world trade patterns 
(Pelagidis and Papasotirou, 2002).  
 
The more interesting question for third-country investors, though, is whether increased 
intraregional trade comes at their expense. Athukorala (2006) finds that even though there has 
been a rapid expansion of components trade within AFTA, this has been complemented by 
increased trade in final goods with countries outside the region.
7 Furthermore, as noted above, 
and observed by Dobson and Yue (1997) and Kawai (2007), increased regionalization in Asia 
is offset by continued dependence on non-Asian markets and multinational investors. The end 
result is that even as the Asian region continues to experience greater integration, its 
dependence on the global economy constrains inward-looking policy choices.  
 
Will the recent shift towards PTAs change such a pattern? When compiling all the 
regression estimates of authoritative studies, the World Bank (2005) was unable in a recent 
study to reach any definitive conclusions as to whether PTAs are in fact trade- or FDI-
                                                 
6 The APEC process can still be argued today as proceeding along open regionalism lines in the sense that its 
Member countries individual action plans are typically pursued on an MFN basis. 
7 Production-sharing leads to massive double counting of published trade data as goods cross multiple borders in 
the course of their production. If not controlled for, this will overestimate the importance of intra-regional trade, 
and underestimate the importance of extra-regional trade and thus generate misleading inferences as to regional 
integration trends in trade (Athukorala, 2003; Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006).  
  36diverting per se. It seems that some agreements can induce such effects, while others do not. 
The devil, as always, lies in the details of individual agreements.  So what, then, may explain 
some of the variations observed?  
 
First, PTAs that are open to trade with third countries and cover practically all 
economic sectors are typically found to be less trade- and investment-diverting on average. 
Too high external tariff barriers relative to preferential tariffs and too many exceptions will 
tend to lead to trade and investment diversion and thus likely hurt third-country suppliers or 
compel them to adopt business models – via FDI – that they would otherwise not pursue. 
Also, since countries in Asia continue to rely significantly on extra-regional trade for their 
growth dynamism, trade diversion would hurt Asian countries themselves (Athukorala and 
Yamashita, 2006).  
 
Until recently, the tendency had been towards declining margins of regional 
preference – for example between the average MFN and preferential tariffs – for ASEAN 
members, indicating that trade liberalization conducted multilaterally was moving faster than 
that conducted along regional lines (Kimura and Ando, 2003; Damuri and others, 2006). The 
recent acceleration of tariff cuts under AFTA, the proliferation of preferential trade 
agreements and the continued negotiated gridlock in Geneva, suggest that the relationship 
described above has been somewhat reversed over the course of the Doha Development 
Round of negotiations, which began in 2001.  
 
At the same time, it must be emphasized that third-country traders and investors have 
benefited from the continued commitment of Asian countries to liberalize their trade and 
investment regimes, as well as their regulatory regimes in services, on an autonomous basis. 
Simply put, and as  noted earlier in regard to liberal rule of origin/denial of benefits clauses, 
third countries have often enjoyed quasi- or de facto MFN treatment in their trade and 
investment relations with Asian countries.  
 
To date, there is very limited evidence of trade and investment policy backsliding in 
Asia, such that the wedge between actual (applied) and bound policies and measures and the 
fact that third countries are not direct beneficiaries of the protective properties of policy 
bindings have not proven unduly problematic in most instances.  
 
  37Many of the recent or currently negotiated Asian PTAs focus on economy-wide 
liberalization rather than creating “carve-outs” to serve particular rent-seeking sectors and 
interests (ADB, 2006; Plummer, 2006). For this reason, Frankel (1997), Fink and Primo 
Braga (1999), Li (2000), Clark and Tavares (2000), Gilbert, Scollay and Bora (2001) and 
Soloaga and Winters (1999) all find that AFTA has been more trade-creating than diverting. 
Also, recently concluded negotiations over an ASEAN-China PTA, while initially limited to 
goods trade (a services complement has since been added), liberalizes 98 per cent of all tariff 
lines and includes trade in agricultural products which can help to create  momentum for 
further agricultural liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region (Cheong and Kwong, 2005; 
Feridhanusetyawan, 2005).  
 
Of course, there are important 
exceptions to the trends depicted 
above. Some of the recent PTAs of 
Thailand and a number of 
agreements into which India has 
entered appear to have been driven 
more by mercantilistic than liberal 
ideals and feature highly selective 
preferential tariff dismantling rather 
than comprehensive liberalization, 
ultimately calling into question their 
compatibility with the disciplines of 
Article 24 of GATT (Sally, 2006). 
Nonetheless, most Asian PTAs – 
those in existence today and those 
under negotiation – tend to be liberal 
in character and maintain relatively 
small margins of preference for 
regional producers (ADB, 2006; 
Plummer, 2006; Kawai, 2007; 
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Box 3.2 Tariff reductions in selected Asian 
preferential trade agreements 
 
ASEAN Free Trade Area: Negative list approach, 0 
per cent target. The CEPT scheme allows countries 
to maintain temporary exclusions, a sensitive 
products list and general exclusion lists. 
Commodities are phased into inclusion gradually, 
and there is a longer time frame for the CLMV 
countries. ASEAN-6 reached 0-5 per cent tariff in 
2003 and Viet Nam in 2006. Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic and Myanmar are to do so in 
2008, and Cambodia in 2010. 
 
Japan-Singapore: Positive-list approach. Tariffs on 
Singapore's imports from Japan will be 0 per cent 
immediately. Complete tariff elimination in Japan with 
10-year transition period. Japan maintains some 
exceptions, including meat and meat products, fruit 
and vegetables, dairy products, and cane and beet 
sugar. 
 
ASEAN-China:  Negative-list approach. Under the 
normal track, tariffs will be eliminated by 2010 for 
ASEAN-6. Under the sensitive track, tariff reductions 
will start in 2012, to reach 0-5 per cent tariff levels by 
2018. ASEAN-4/CLMV countries are given five more 
years to follow a similar tariff reduction scheme. 
Tariffs on goods under the Early Harvest 
Programme, which includes agricultural products 
(Chapters 01 to 08 of the HS code), will be reduced 
to zero for ASEAN-6 and China. 
 
ASEAN-India:  Positive-list approach. Progressive 
elimination of tariffs in substantially all trade in goods. 
Under the normal track, tariffs will be reduced or 
eliminated by 2011 for Brunei Darussalam, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, and by 
2016 for other ASEAN members. Specific treatment 
is foreseen for sensitive products. The early harvest 
programme follows a positive-list approach. 
Source: Feridhanusetyawan, 2005. Note: ASEAN-6: Original free 




An important question is whether such a 
benign policy environment will continue 
to define the norm or whether the 
region’s recent conversion to PTA-
centric forms of integration will raise 
new hurdles for third country traders and 
investors.  
 
A second source of potential variance in 
the effects of PTAs relates to the design 
of rules of origin for goods trade. 
Lacking a harmonized global rule of 
origin regime, PTAs with too strict or 
complex rules-of-origin have been 
shown to exert trade-and investment-
diverting effects that can nullify or 
impair some of the new trade opportunities a PTA is supposed to create (Panagariya, 1998). 
One study has shown that the rules of origin adopted in the NAFTA were equivalent to an 
added tariff of 4.3 per cent (Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2004). It is therefore unfortunate 
that, apart from ASEAN members within AFTA, Asian PTAs have so far tended to eschew 
simple and transparent rules of origin for trade in goods (James, 2006). This is notably the 
case of an otherwise “benign” agreement such as that between Japan and Singapore (see box 
4).  
Box 4.  Rules of origin in AFTA and the 
Japan-Singapore PTA 
 
AFTA: Rules of origin are relatively simple and 
liberal. A product has to satisfy 40 per cent of its 
content originating from any member States. 
Cumulative rules of origin state that inputs for 
finished products eligible for preferential 
treatment in other member states shall be 
considered as originating in the member State 
where working or processing of the finished 
product has taken place, provided that the 
aggregate ASEAN content of the final products is 
not less than 40 per cent.  
 
Japan-Singapore: Rules of origin are less liberal 
and rather complex. Liberal rules of origin 
typically apply a general rule that the local 
content of the product has to be at 40–50 per 
cent. In the Japan-Singapore agreement, rules of 
origin are product specific, or the originating 
content must be no less than 60 per cent of the 
total value of the materials. The material must 
undergo the final production process in the 
territory of either party. Simple cutting, mixing, 
and packaging are not considered sufficient 




Source: Feridhanusetyawan, 2005. 
 
Moreover, even though AFTA rules of origin are relatively simple, the Asian Development 
Bank (2006) finds that one of the reasons why the promotion of intraregional trade in AFTA 
has not achieved its full potential relates to the costs of complying with regional rules of 
origin, especially when compared with the relatively small margins of preference granted by 
AFTA tariff concessions. It seems that only multinationals in very high-tariff sectors such as 
                                                 
8 Though margins of preference under AFTA fell steadily between 1994 and 2001, a period during which 
Uruguay Round tariff cuts became effective, Hapsari and Mangunsong (2006), citing work by Damuri et al. 
(2006), report evidence of rising preference margins - hence of likely trade diversion – within ASEAN in 2002-
03, a trend which the protracted state of the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda is unlikely to counter.  
  39automobiles have found it worthwhile to go through the bureaucratic procedures of obtaining 
an AFTA rule-of-origin certificate.  
 
Cuyvers and others (2005), Plummer (2006) and Baldwin (2006) note that one of the 
great challenges, for both Asian and non-Asian countries, is to prevent Asian PTAs from 
creating a “noodle bowl” of criss-crossing rules which would increase the costs of trade 
within Asian. If this is not done, many firms would find it cheaper simply to pay the MFN 
duty rather than comply with complex rules. The likely end result may be fewer new trade 
and investment opportunities in the region. 
 
One means of minimizing the potentially adverse impact of PTAs on third-country 
producers is to have them integrate “deeper” and “wider” than is possible at the multilateral 
level: i.e., address more sectors, liberalize more comprehensively and address a wider set of 
regulatory impediments to trade and investment. Even if tariffs are fully removed, the 
business environment in Asia is still far from borderless (Kimura and Ando, 2003), partly 
because technical barriers accompanying inspection procedures for exports and imports are 
for instance prevalent (Wakasugi, 2007).  
 
Moreover, it is most likely in non-goods trade – such as services, that the greatest 
benefits from integration can accrue. As noted previously, trade and investment in many key 
Asian service sectors is still restricted by excessive or discriminatory regulations. This can be 
problematic for service sector multinational enterprises, but also for firms in manufacturing 
and in other sectors that are tightly connected to production networks throughout the region. 
  
One of the basic pillars of regional and international production sharing is low trade 
facilitation and service link costs. Gains from services liberalization in Asia (and elsewhere) 
have generally been found to exceed those from goods liberalization by significant margins, 
by up to a factor of five according to one study (Robinson and others, 1999). Dee and 
Hanslow (2000) find that APEC countries could realize gains of US$110 billion from 
liberalizing services trade, and that China alone could benefit by as much as US$70 billion by 
removing its stringent service sector restrictions. Chadha (2000), Brown et al (1996), Chadha 
and others (2000), Bejamin and Diao (2000) come to similar conclusions. Even though the 
largest economic gains from services liberalization come from non-preferential market 
  40opening, PTAs can be useful tools for moving forward in what are often politically sensitive 
areas (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1996; OECD, 2002).  
 
To convey a sense of shared will to engage in economic cooperation beyond the 
reciprocal exchange of market access commitments, the newer generation of preferential trade 
agreements in Asia, such as those agreed between Singapore and Japan, ASEAN and China, 
and ASEAN and Japan, as well as the India-ASEAN agreement, all explicitly use the term 
“comprehensive economic partnership” rather than “free trade agreement” 
(Feridhanusetyawan, 2005). 
 
In services, Asian PTAs typically adopt a GATS+ approach, whether in terms of 
agreed rules or especially negotiated market opening commitments (Roy, Marchetti and Lim, 
2006; Fink and Molinuevo, 2007). Many such agreements also feature cooperative initiatives 
relating to the movement of natural persons, including in the realm of mutual recognition 
agreements in regulated professions (UNCTAD, 2007), though this is not the case of recent 
US PTAs.  
 
Japan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Viet 
Nam have all made notable commitments on services trade and investment in their PTAs. On 
the other hand, countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand have tended to schedule 
very limited commitments over and above those taken in the Uruguay round (with the obvious 
exception of AFAS for intra-ASEAN trade and investment in services).  
 
The Singapore-Japan agreement is a prime example of a PTA that, apart from its 
chapters on investment and services, goes far “behind the border” in addressing infrastructure 
and rules, customs procedures and a variety of other indirect measures affecting trade flows. 
Such advances have prompted Hertel and others (2001) to conclude that the so-called “new-
age” agreement between Singapore and Japan would not likely be trade-diverting overall and 
that third countries would not lose out.
9  
 
The rise of preferentialism in Asia has, with few exceptions, generally been 
characterized as a “WTO-plus” process (WTO+), which, ceteris paribus, should help to create 
                                                 
9 It should be noted, however, that such a result is based on ex ante calculations and not the actual effects of the 
agreement. 
  41a better institutional setting for markets to function across borders and should therefore 
stimulate greater trade among partners, including third countries.   
 
Turning more specifically to the possible impacts of deepening economic integration 
on investment behavior, Chase (2003) notes that bilateral or regional integration should be of 
particular interest to multinational firms since proximity has obvious benefits for investors 
spreading production across borders. Unfortunately, studies investigating the effect of PTAs 
on investment flows are relatively few. Stein and Duade (2001), Yeyati and others (2003), 
and Medvedev (2006) find that PTAs do increase intra-bloc investment. Similarly, a recent 
study by the OECD (2007) finds that PTAs with comprehensive investment provisions exert a 
strongly positive impact on induced FDI flows among partner countries. Such results would 
appear to indicate that the recent surge in Asian PTAs should increase investment flows 
among Asian countries. This is particularly the case since the most substantial impact on FDI 
seems to occur when PTAs coincide with domestic liberalization and concerted efforts at 
macroeconomic stabilization among member countries. These are the conditions that have 
generally obtained in Asia in recent years (Blomström and Kokko, 1997; 2001; Graham and 
Wada, 2000). 
 
Once again, the interesting question for third countries is whether PTA-driven 
integration is due to investment diversion or creation? Some evidence suggests that 
investment diversion can become a source of genuine concern under some PTAs, with 
adverse third-country effects. For instance, the World Bank (2000) found that FDI declined in 
EFTA members following the phase-in of the European Union Internal Market Program 
(IMP) and did not recover until the establishment of the European Economic Area. In 
addition, Serven and Lederman (2005) show that NAFTA resulted in diversion of FDI from 
other countries in Latin America, as Mexico’s share of United States-sourced investment 
remained stable throughout the 1990s while the share of other countries declined. 
 
The evidence for PTA-induced investment diversion is not clear cut, however. 
Echoing the more recent findings of the OECD, Adams and others. (2003) and Dee and Gali 
(2003) show that strong investment provisions in PTAs have a net investment-creation effect. 
Kimura and Ando (2003; 2005) note that the generally low margins of preference among 
Asian countries will tend to mitigate biases against foreign firms. The existence of 
sophisticated production and distribution networks would encourage activities of all 
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region.  
 
As noted above, the most recent vintage PTAs promote economic ties through various 
investment facilitation activities, some of which also benefit third-country firms. The 
framework agreement of the ASEAN Investment Area and the Singapore-Japan agreement 
both foresee information sharing, simplification and transparency of procedures and rules. 
Such provisions stand to benefit not only PTA members but also non-Asian multination 
enterprises investing in Asian markets as they enhance service links between production 
networks (Thorbecke and Yoshitomi, 2006). Te Velde and Bezemer (2004) thus find that 
membership in a PTA can lead to further extra regional FDI inflows, i.e. the increased 
opportunities for investment among partner countries also stimulate FDI from third countries. 
This is confirmed in the case of MERCOSUR, where most new FDI has came from outside 
the PTA (Chudnovsky and López, 2001) as well as in the case of the Canada-United States 
FTA (subsequently NAFTA), where FDI to Canada from Europe increased much more than 
that from the United States (Globerman, 2002).  
 
  Apart from PTAs, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are another legal instrument 
used to promote economic integration. The aim of host countries in signing BITs is to 
enhance the investment climate (i.e. BITs may be seen as serving a “signalling” function vis-
à-vis foreign investors) and attract more FDI by granting strong protection rights against 
discriminatory (investment liberalization) or confiscatory (investment protection) state 
conduct.  
 
Most Asian countries have signed numerous BITs. China has, for instance, signed 
BITs with over 100 countries and the Republic of Korea and Malaysia with more than 60 
each. Most such agreements are North-South in character and involve treaties entered into 
between Asian and OECD countries, but intra-Asian BITs are also becoming increasingly 
common, in response to the rise of a number of Asian-origin multinational firms. 
 
In theory, BITs can be an important instrument in promoting FDI to Asia from 
multinationals headquartered in OECD countries and in enhancing host countries’ investment 
regimes. However, empirical studies devoted to the subject conclude that BITs exert an 
indeterminate influence on investment flows between signatories. Hallward-Driemeier (2003), 
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of BITs on induced FDI flows.  
 
In contrast, Neumayer and Spess (2005), Salacuse and Sullivan (2005) and Banga 
(2003) find strong and positive associations between the number of BITs a country has signed 
and its FDI inflows. Banga (2007) further finds evidence of a link between BITs and the 
recent FDI outflow performance of a number of Asian countries. However, association is 
different from causation, and Aisbett (2007) shows that these latter studies fail to take into 
account that BIT signatories tend to experience large FDI inflows before signing the 
agreement, and that have no marginal effect BITs by themselves after they have been signed.  
 
Moreover, BITs do not seem to ‘substitute’ for property-rights - as Neumayer and 
Spess (2005) claim; that is, investors do not regard BITs as a sufficient safeguard against a 
general disrespect of property rights by host governments.  This does not rule out, however, 
that investors can value the usefulness of BITs when deciding where to invest, particularly as 
confidence in the robustness of investor-State arbitration procedures increases in the context 
of heightened judicial activism.  
 
Also, BITs should not be seen in isolation from broader integrating trends. One recent 
study suggests that BITs might influence investment behaviour when complemented by an 
investor-friendly political and economic environment (Tobin and Rose-Ackerman, 2006).  
 
Further, there is scant evidence on whether BITs matter more for FDI flows in certain 
sectors, than in others (in either manufacturing or services), or for some types of investments 
rather than others (that is, resource- versus. efficiency- versus. market-seeking FDI) 
Expropriation risks are typically greatest in natural resource industries, for instance, such that 
BITs may have a particularly useful role to play in such sectors despite their more marginal 
use in other areas (Aisbett, 2007). Finally, it is still uncertain whether BITs with pre-
establishment rights, such as those negotiated by Canada and the United States, exert greater 
impacts on investment flows relative to agreements limited to post-establishment rights.  
 
The empirical evidence currently available thus suggests that BITs do not on the 
whole appear to exert determinative impacts on the investment decisions of multinational 
firms, though some of the finer elements of analysis, notably regarding their effect on various 
  44types of investment (resource-versus market-versus efficiency-seeking FDI) are quite clearly 
worthy of greater analytical scrutiny.  
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